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Anglo-American jurisprudence traditionally identifies the right of self-
determination as fundamental to the principles on which our common
culture and our two societies are based. English law claims to share with
the law of the United States of America a commitment to the right of
individuals to determine what shall be done with their own bodies. This
Article seeks to explore, in the context of recent English medical-ethical
case law, the extent to which the judicial rhetoric of medical self-determi-
nation is indeed matched by the law which the English courts have been
developing in recent years, that is, both the law in the sense of formal
rules and the law as actually applied in judicial practice.
I. LEGAL RHETORIC
It is not difficult to find in the recent English medical case law ringing
declarations of the competent adult patient's right of self-determination.
Thus, in In re F, Lord Goff of Chieveley, acknowledging what he called
"the libertarian principle of self-determination," cited with approval the
famous words of Justice Cardozo: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's con-
sent, commits an assault."' So in In re T,2 Lord Donaldson of Lymington
MR recognised "The patient's.., right to self-determination-his right to
live his own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to
his premature death." And in the same case,3 Lord Justice Butler-Sloss
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This Article retains British spelling and citation form.
1. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 73C, quoting Schoendorff v.
Society of New York Hospitals, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
2. '[n re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fain 95, 112E.
3. d. at 116G.
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cited with approval the judgment of Mr. Justice Robins in Malette v
Shulman:
4
The right to determine what shall be done with one's own body
is a fundamental right in our society. The concepts inherent in
this right are the bedrock upon which the principles of self-de-
termination and individual autonomy are based. Free individual
choice in matters affecting this right should, in my opinion, be
accorded very high priority.
The philosophical foundation for this view of the law is derived by the
judges from John Stuart Mill's ON LIBERTY.5 As Mr. Justice Ward said in
Re E:6 "The law must recognise that fundamental principle that adults of
full capacity have freedom of choice. It echoes the libertarian philosophy
of John Stuart Mill. It finds support in the jurisprudence both here and in
the USA."7
II. FORMAL LAW
This judicial invocation of the right of self-determination is not a mere
rhetorical flourish. English law is clear and unequivocal. A competent
adult patient has an absolute right to refuse consent to any medical treat-
ment or invasive procedure, "for reasons which are rational or irrational
or for no reason," as Lord Templeman put it in Sidaway v Board of Gov-
ernors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital,8 and
"even in circumstances where she is ... certain to die in the absence of
treatment." 9 The same absolute principle applies to a competent pa-
tient's anticipatory refusal of consent. An "advance directive" or "living
will" is similarly binding and effective notwithstanding that the patient
has subsequently become and remains incompetent. 10 If a competent
adult has expressed an unequivocal decision to refuse treatment, it is not
for the doctor or the court to speculate as to the strength of the patient's
personal or religious convictions or as to his reasons for refusing consent.
Nor is it for the doctor or the court to speculate as to what the patient's
4. Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321, 336b.
5. Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386, 389H.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley
Hospital [1985] AC 871, 904F.
9. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 121H (per Lord Justice
Staughton).
10. Id.; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treat-
ment) [1994] 1 WLR 290.
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decision might have been if he had directed his mind to the current crisis,
or if he had been more fully informed, or if he had had more forcibly
brought home to him all the implications of his refusal. If it is not possible
to say what the patient's decision would have been if he had been given
more information: his expressed decision, if he was competent to make
it, is decisive, even if it was not made in contemplation of life-threatening
circum:;tances." Furthermore, English law emphatically rejects the doc-
trine that the state's interests can ever prevail over the competent pa-
tient's right of self-determination.
As is well known, case law in the United States identifies four poten-
tially countervailing state interests: (1) the interest of the state in preserv-
ing life; (2) the interest of the state in preventing suicide; (3) the interest
of the state in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession; and (4)
the interest of the state in protecting innocent third parties. 12 The first
three have never been treated in English law as capable of prevailing
against the individual's right of self-determination.' 3 Thus, English law
asserts that the principle of self-determination prevails over the sanctity
of hunmlan life.' n In this connection it is perhaps worth pointing out that
suicide is no longer a crime in England, having been decriminalised by
the Suicide Act 1961,'5 and that in any event, as Lord Goff of Chieveley
explained in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, where a competent patient dies
as a result of refusing treatment:
[T]here is no question of the patient having committed suicide,
ncr therefore of the doctor having aided or abetted him in doing
so. 6 It is simply that the patient has, as he is entitled to do,
declined to consent to treatment which might or would have had
the effect of prolonging his life and the doctor has, in accord-
ance with his duty, complied with his patient's wishes. 7
Two recent cases illustrate this uncompromising approach. In In re C, a
11. Malette v Shulman (1987) 47 DLR (4th) 18, 44, 47 (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321, 331a-
332c, 332f-333d, 335a-338b.
12. See, for an early example, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977).
13. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 102D; Secretary of State for
the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fain 127.
14. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 827A (per Hoffmann U), 864D (per
Lord Goff of Chieveley).
15. The Suicide Act 1961, 59 The Twentieth Century Statutes 160, sec. 2(1), (Eng.).
This statute makes it an offence punishable by up to 14 years of imprisonment to aid, abet,
counsel or procure the suicide of another person.
16. Id.
17. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864G.
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sixty-eight-year-old paranoid schizophrenic prisoner was held to be enti-
tled to refuse consent to amputation of his gangrenous leg even though
the prognosis was that he was likely to die imminently if the leg was not
amputated.18 Mr. Justice Thorpe found that, despite his chronic mental
illness, the patient was competent to make his own decision; and accord-
ingly, his right of self-determination had not been displaced and would be
protected by the grant of declaratory and injunctive relief.'9 In Secretary
of State for the Home Department v Robb, the question was whether the
prison authorities were under any duty to force-feed a prisoner on a hun-
ger strike.2° Consigning "to the archives of legal history" the much
criticised decision of Lord Alverstone CJ in Leigh v Gladstone,2' a case
involving the force feeding of an imprisoned suffragette, and having con-
sidered In re Caulk22 and Thor v. Superior Court,23 Mr. Justice Thorpe
held that a competent adult prisoner has an absolute right to refuse food
and that the authorities accordingly have neither the authority, nor, a for-
tiori, the duty to force-feed him if he goes on a hunger strike.24 Having
considered each of the four identified countervailing state interests, Mr.
Justice Thorpe said:
It seems to me that within this jurisdiction there is perhaps a
stronger emphasis on the right of the individual's self-determi-
nation when balance comes to be struck between that right and
any countervailing interests of the state. So this decision is not a
borderline one: this is a plain case for declaratory relief. The
right of the defendant to determine his future is plain. That right
is not diminished by his status as a detained prisoner. The rights
of the prisoner ... are plainly stated in Leech v Deputy Gover-
nor of Parkhurst Prison [1988] AC 533. Against the specific right
of self-determination held by the defendant throughout his sen-
tence there seems to me in this case to be no countervailing
state interest to be set in the balance.
The fourth identified state interest has caused more trouble. In In re T,
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR identified as "the only possible quali-
fication" to the absolute principle of self-determination "a case in which
18. In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290.
19. Id. at 295B, 296B.
20. Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam 127.
21. Leigh v Gladstone [1909] 26 TLR 139.
22. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984).
23. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
24. Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam 127, 130C.
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the choice may lead to the death of a viable foetus."25 But after initially
flirting with the view that the state's interest in the protection of innocent
third parties could in some circumstances justify such a procedure,26 it has
now been held that there are no circumstances in which a nonconsensual
Caesarean section can be performed on a competent woman. As Lord
Justice Butler-Sloss said in Re MB:
A competent woman who has the capacity to decide may, for
religious reasons, other reasons, for rational or irrational rea-
sons or for no reason at all, choose not to have medical interven-
tion, even though the consequence may be the death or serious
handicap of the child she bears, or her own death. In that event
the courts do not have the jurisdiction to declare medical inter-
vention lawful and the question of her own best interests objec-
tively considered, does not arise.... If therefore the competent
mother refuses to have the medical intervention, the doctors
may not lawfully do more than attempt to persuade her. If that
persuasion is unsuccessful, there are no further steps towards
medical intervention to be taken. ... The only situation in which
it is lawful for the doctors to intervene is if it is believed that the
adult patient lacks the capacity to decide.... The law is, in our
judgment, clear that a competent woman who has the capacity
to decide may, for religious reasons, other reasons, or for no
reasons at all, choose not to have medical intervention, even
though.., the consequence may be the death or serious handi-
cap of the child she bears or her own death .... The court does
not have the jurisdiction to declare that such medical interven-
tion is lawful to protect the interests of the unborn child even at
the point of birth.27
All in all, it can now be asserted with some confidence that English law
does not recognise any of the four identified state interests as capable of
prevailing against the competent individual's right of self-determination.
III. LIMITATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Despite all the rhetoric, the right to self-determination is, at bottom,
only a right to choose whether to give or to refuse to give consent to the
treatment (or, if alternative treatments are proposed by the doctor, to
25. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 102D.
26. In re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Faro 123 (an extremely controversial
and much criticised decision at first instance, in which Sir Stephen Brown P referred to In
re AC, :573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
27. Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, 436H-437B, 438D, 438H, 444E-G.
1998]
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one or other of the treatments) proposed by the patient's doctor. The
right to consent is merely a power to consent, not a power to compel. The
patient cannot compel an unwilling doctor or health authority to provide
treatment, whether that refusal is based on the doctor's clinical or ethical
judgment or on a lack of resources. In such a case, the patient's only
remedy is to find another doctor, if he can, who is prepared to give the
desired treatment.
Nor is the patient any better off by seeking to invoke the assistance of
the court. The court will never make an order requiring a particular doc-
tor or health authority to treat a patient in a manner contrary to their
wishes.28 There are two reasons for this. First, as a matter of policy, the
court will never make an order compelling a doctor to treat a patient in a
manner contrary to his clinical judgment and professional duty.29 Where
the court disagrees with the views of the attending physician, the solution
is to find another doctor who shares the court's views, not to coerce the
existing doctor. Second, again as a matter of policy, the court declines to
answer questions relating to the resource implications of proposed treat-
ment. The court further refuses to adjudicate in disputes between pa-
tients, doctors and health authorities arising out of the denial of
treatment due to a lack of resources or the allocation of scarce resources
to other patients or to other forms of treatment.30 This policy of judicial
abdication reflects two deeply entrenched principles of the English law's
approach to public bodies. First, the statutory duties imposed upon public
bodies by welfare state legislation31 are traditionally seen as not giving
rise to any claim by an aggrieved individual justiciable in private law.32
28. In re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33, 41E, 48D; In re
R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11, 22D, 26E; In re J (A Mi-
nor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15, 27A, 29F, 31A.
29. In re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15, 26H-27B,
29E-30C, 31A.
30. R v Secretary of State for Social Services, West Midlands Regional Health Author-
ity and Birmingham Area Health Authority (Teaching) ex parte Hincks (1980) 1 BMLR 93
(patients on waiting list for orthopaedic surgery); R v Central Birmingham Health Author-
ity ex parte Walker (1987) 3 BMLR 32 (premature baby requiring heart surgery); R v
Central Birmingham Health Authority ex parte Collier [1988] CAT 88/1 (four-year-old
child in immediate danger to health requiring heart surgery); In re J (A Minor) (Wardship:
Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33, 41H; In re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treat-
ment) [1993] Fam 15, 28A-E, 30C-E, 31C; R v Cambridge Health Authority ex parte B
[1995] 1 WLR 898, reversing [1995] 1 FLR 1055 (experimental treatment of 10-year-old
child suffering from leukaemia).
31. In this context, the National Health Service Act 1977, replacing the National
Health Service Act 1946.
32. X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633.
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Second, in the context of public law, judicial control, by the mechanism of
judicial review, is confined to three grounds: illegality, procedural impro-
priety or irrationality, the latter being confined to what Lord Diplock in
Council of Civil Service Unions. v Minister for the Civil Service described
as "a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of ac-
cepted. moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind
to the question to be decided could have arrived at it."33
Medical treatment issues naturally will not involve any issue of either
illegality or procedural impropriety, as those terms are understood in
English law, and the test of "irrationality" is so stringent as to be almost
imposs;ible to meet. This is particularly the case where the decision re-
lates to the prioritisation or allocation of scarce resources, whether
human or financial, matters which the judges treat in practice, if not in
theory, as being nonjusticiable.
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR summarized the issue well in two
cases. Each involved the exercise of the inherent parens patriae jurisdic-
tion over children, but the point is a fortiori in the case of a competent
adult. First, in In re J,3 4 Lord Donaldson stated:
No one can dictate the treatment to be given to the child-
neither court, parents nor doctors. There are checks and bal-
ances. The doctors can recommend treatment A in preference to
treatment B. They can also refuse to adopt treatment C on the
grounds that it is medically contra-indicated or for some other
reason is a treatment which they could not conscientiously ad-
minister. The court or parents for their part can refuse consent
to treatment A or B or both, but cannot insist upon treatment C.
The inevitable and desirable result is that choice of treatment is
in some measure a joint decision of the doctors and the court or
parents. This co-operation is reinforced by another considera-
tion. Doctors nowadays recognise that their function is not a
limited technical one of repairing or servicing a body. They are
treating people in a real life context. This at once enhances the
contribution which the court or parents can make towards
reaching the best possible decision in all the circumstances. Fi-
nally mention should be made of one problem to the solution of
which neither court nor parents can make any contribution. In
an imperfect world resources will always be limited and on occa-
sion agonising choices will have to be made in allocating those
33. Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374,
410G.
34. In re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fain 33, 41E-42A, 48D-E.
19981
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resources to particular patients. It, is outwith the scope of this
judgment to give any guidance as to the circumstances which
should determine such an allocation. . . . neither the court in
wardship proceedings, nor, I think, a local authority having care
and control of the baby is able to require the [health] authority
to follow a particular course of treatment. What the court can do
is to withhold consent to treatment of which it disapproves and
it can express its approval of other treatment proposed by the
authority and its doctors.35
Secondly, in In re W, Lord Donaldson stated:
There seems to be some confusion in the minds of some as to
the purpose of seeking consent from a patient (whether adult or
child) or from someone with authority to give that consent on
behalf of the patient. It has two purposes, the one clinical and
the other legal. The clinical purpose stems from the fact that in
many instances the co-operation of the patient and the patient's
faith or at least confidence in the efficacy of the treatment is a
major factor contributing to the treatment's success. Failure to
obtain such consent will not only deprive the patient and the
medical staff of this advantage, but will usually make it much
more difficult to administer the treatment. I appreciate that this
purpose may not be served if consent is given on behalf of,
rather than by, the patient. However, in the case of young chil-
dren knowledge of the fact that the parent has consented may
help. The legal purpose is quite different. It is to provide those
concerned in the treatment with a defence to a criminal charge
of assault or battery or a civil claim for damages for trespass to
the person. It does not, however, provide them with any defence
to a claim that they negligently advised a particular treatment or
negligently carried it out.36
Thus, in Hohfeldian terms, when treating "right" as the correlative of
"duty,, 37 the "right of self-determination" is a misnomer. There is no
right to determine what shall be done to one's own body; there is only a
right to determine what shall not be done to one's body.
IV. LEGAL REALITY
In practice, and even within the sphere in which in theory it is free to
35. Id.
36. In re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fain 64, 76E-
H.
37. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 36-38 (1966).
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operate, the so-called right of self-determination tends to be cramped in
two ways. Genuine adherence to the principle of self-determination re-
quires, first, that competent patients are given sufficient information to
give them the option of reaching an informed choice. Second, it requires
that their decisions are respected, even if when judged from the "ra-
tional" perspective of the doctor or judge, whose decisions may seem un-
wise, unreasonable or even irrational. English law has difficulty
accommodating itself to either of these precepts. In the first place, there
is a teiadency to downplay the amount of information that patients re-
quire or are entitled to receive. In the second place, and more insidi-
ously, there is a tendency to impose an unrealistically stringent test of
capacity, particularly in those cases where patients are judged to be un-
reasonably refusing life-saving treatment. In short, English law in practice
tends to "talk down" the patient's need for information, while at the same
time paradoxically tending to "talk up" the patient's need for capacity.
The practical effect in both cases is to weigh the balance against the pa-
tient in favour of the doctor. The competent patient is expected to come
to a decision on the basis of such information as the doctor thinks it ap-
propriate to give. The patient whose decision in a potentially life-threat-
ening situation is felt to be unwise, unreasonable or worse, may find
himself-more usually, herself-categorised by the doctor and the court
as incompetent; and consequently38 subjected to the treatment that the
doctor, or the court, feels, or chooses to assert, is the patient's best
interests.
To return to Hohfeldian analysis, the patient's "immunity" and the doc-
tor's correlative "disability,"39 both of which are implicated in the so-
called "right of self-determination," are in practice far less absolute than
either rhetoric or formal legal rules would suggest.
The adverse consequences for the patient are exacerbated by two fur-
ther characteristics of the typical English judicial approach to such cases.
First, the courts fail to articulate, let alone enforce, appropriate proce-
dural and substantive safeguards for the patient whose consent is sought
to be dispensed with. Second, the courts fail,4 ° and in some cases re-
fuse,41 to articulate what is meant by a patient's "best interests." The fail-
ure of the House of Lords to formulate either procedural or substantive
38. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 51G, 56D, 71H-77D.
39. Hohfeld, supra note 37, at 36, 60-63.
40. For an egregious and much criticised example of such failure, see In re B (A Mi-
nor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199.
41. In re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33, 52D (per
1998]
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safeguards for children 42 and incompetent adults43 in cases of nonthera-
peutic sterilisations compelled the Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court
to publish appropriate guidelines in a Practice Note.44 And only very re-
cently have the courts sought to formulate these safeguards for cases
where the patient's capacity is or may be in issue, 4 or where the court is
being invited to sanction coercive treatment methods.46
V. CONSENT
English law does not recognise the doctrines of "informed consent" or
"informed refusal of consent" in the sense in which those terms are used
in North America.47 This has two consequences. First, so far as concerns
the law of trespass, the only question is whether the patient knew in
broad terms the nature and effect of the procedure to which he was giving
or refusing consent. 48 This is not a particularly stringent test. The law of
trespass accordingly does little to assist the patient in obtaining enough
information to make real the right of self-determination. Moreover, there
is judicial opposition to the use of trespass as a means of enforcing appro-
priate standards of medical behaviour. That view has been forcibly ex-
pressed that in general, the proper cause of action, if any, is negligence
and not trespass.49
Second, the law of negligence does little to compel disclosure by the
doctor to his patient of relevant information. The "Bolam" test5" of pro-
Balcombe I); In re T (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, 254F
(per Waite U).
42. In re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199.
43. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
44. Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 FLR 447. The current re-
vised text is Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Sterilisation) [1996] 2 FLR 111. The Official
Solicitor has also issued a Practice Note in relation to PVS cases: Practice Note (Official
Solicitor: Persistent Vegetative State) [1996] 2 FLR 375 replacing earlier text in [1994] 1
FLR 654.
45. Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, 436G-437H, 439D, 445A-G.
46. Re C (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180, 196H-201F; Re MB
(Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, 445A-G.
47. Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley
Hospital [1985] AC 871; In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 115B.
48. Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, 442C, 442G-443E; Hills v Potter [1984] 1
WLR 641n, 646H-647E, 653D; In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, li5A-
C.
49. Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, 443C; Hills v Potter [1984] 1 WLR 641n,
653E; Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley
Hospital [1985] AC 871, 883E.
50. Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
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fessiortal negligence applies as much to the advice that a doctor gives to
his patient, including any warnings he ought to give, as to his functions of
diagnosis and treatment.51 A doctor falls foul of the "Bolam" test only if
he is guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty if
acting with ordinary care.52 That is a difficult test for any plaintiff to es-
tablish. Where there is room for differences of medical opinion and prac-
tice, a doctor who follows an acceptable school of thought is not
negligent, even if there is another school of thought that considers his
decision to have been wrong.53
In short, subject to compliance with the minimum disclosure require-
ments imposed by the law of trespass, patients are generally required to
receive only such information in arriving at treatment decisions as the
medical profession thinks appropriate.
VI. CAPACITY
An adult is presumed to have mental capacity.54 Therefore, the burden
of proof is on those who seek to rebut the presumption and to assert a
lack of capacity. In relation to medical treatment, the question is whether
the patient is "competent to appreciate the issues involved, 55 so as to be
able to exercise a "right of choice,, 56 and whether he sufficiently "under-
stand[:;] the nature, purpose and effects of the treatment., 57 Fundamen-
tally, the question is whether the -patient has the ability, whether or not
actually exercised, to function rationally. This involves three questions:
58
(1) Can the patient take in, comprehend and retain treatment informa-
tion? (2) Does he believe that information? and (3) Can he weigh the
51. Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley
Hospital [1985] AC 871.
52. Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198, 218D, 220D; Maynard v West
Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634, 638G.
53. Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634, 638E-H,
639F. But see the qualification in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3
WLR 1:151.
54. Regina v Sullivan [1984] AC 156, 170G, 171C (approving M'Naughten's Case
[1843] 10 C & F 200, 210); In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 112G,
115F; Ir Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 295C, 295D; Cambridge-
shire County Council v R (An Adult) [1995] 1 FLR 50, 54A; Re MB (Medical Treatment)
[1997] 2 FLR 426, 436H.
55. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 12D per Lord Donaldson of
Lymington MR.
56. Id. at 31A, 34B per Neill and Butler-Sloss LJJ.
57. In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 295C, 295E per Thorpe J.
58. Id. at 292E, 295C-F.
1998]
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information in the balance so as to arrive at a choice? It is not necessary
for the patient to understand everything about a complicated decision, so
long as he can understand the essentials if explained to him in broad
terms and simple language.
59
As a matter of principle, this is all entirely unobjectionable. But in
practice, it is not too difficult to find that a patient who is unreasonably
refusing treatment, in particular life-saving treatment, lacks capacity. In
that situation, the doctor is freed from the patient's refusal of consent and
the doctor6° is enabled to act in what he conceives to be the patient's best
interests.
It has been said that the degree of capacity required varies with the
circumstances of the particular treatment-it must be commensurate with
the gravity of the decision, 6' for "the more serious the decision, the
greater the capacity required., 62 A high degree of capacity is required to
refuse life-saving treatment.
63
In deciding whether a patient has capacity, the doctor and the court
must consider whether, and if so to what extent, the patient's normal ca-
pacity may have been temporarily reduced by the effects of injury, illness,
drugs, confusion, shock, pain, anxiety, depression, fatigue or panic in-
duced by fear, among other factors.64 In evaluating the evidence, it is easy
for the court to overemphasise these factors. Moreover, and particularly
in such circumstances, it is easy for a judge, while accepting that a patient
is able to take in, comprehend and retain treatment information, and that
he does believe that information, nonetheless to find that the patient
lacks the capacity to weigh the information in the balance. Taking these
two factors together, it is not too difficult if one is so minded, and some
judges in some circumstances appear to be more than willing, to find that
an otherwise normally competent patient is temporarily incompetent to
refuse consent to treatment.
The combination of these two approaches, some might say devices, has
enabled judges in a succession of controversial cases to hold that other-
wise competent pregnant women in the final stages of delivery lack the
59. Cambridgeshire County Council v R (An Adult) [1995] 1 FLR 50, 54A.
60. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 51G, 56D, 71H-77D.
61. Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, 437C.
62. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 113B, 116B per Lord Don-
aldson of Lymington MR.
63. Cf Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386, 391A-F.
64. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 111E-H, 113A-E, 113H,
115G, 118B, 122B; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, 437C, 437G.
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capacity to refuse consent to the Caesarean section, which both the
judges and the attending doctors believe to be in their best interests.65
Likewise in In re T,66 the refusal of a woman in labour to consent to a
blood transfusion was overridden on the ground that her medical condi-
tion rendered her unfit at the time to make a genuine decision.67
VII. THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983
The same result can be, and is, achieved by recourse to statutory pow-
ers. Persons suffering from "mental disorder, 68 are liable to be compul-
sorily detained in accordance with the Mental Health Act 1983. In
relation to such persons, section sixty-three of the Act provides, subject
to certain limited exceptions: "The consent of a patient shall not be re-
quired for any medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder
from which he is suffering ... if the treatment is given by or under the
direction of the responsible medical officer."
"Medical treatment" in section sixty-three means treatment, which
taken as a whole is calculated to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of
the mental disorder from which the patient is suffering and includes a
range of acts ancillary to the core treatment, including those that prevent
the patient from harming himself or which alleviate the symptoms of the
disorder.69 "[R]elieving symptoms is just as much a part of treatment as
relieving the underlying cause. '"70
Again, there is nothing objectionable in principle to such a regime. But
judicial creativity has seen interpretations of section sixty-three that some
might find, at first sight, rather surprising. Thus, "medical treatment" in
65. Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762; Norfolk and
Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR 613; Rochdale Healthcare (NHS)
Trust v C [1997] 1 FCR 274; Re L (Patient: Non-Consensual Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 837;
Re ME; (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426.
66. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95.
67. The willingness of judges to hold otherwise competent pregnant women incompe-
tent when (query, because) they are in the final stages of labour can be contrasted with the
judicial willingness to give effect to the equally life-threatening decisions of the male pris-
oners in In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 and Secretary of State
for the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam 127.
68. Defined in section 1(2) of the Act as meaning "mental illness, arrested or incom-
plete development of mind, psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or disability of
mind."
69. B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] Fam 133, 138E-139B, 140B, affirming [1995]
1 FCR 332.
70. Re KB (Adult) (Mental Patient: Medical Treatment) (1994) 19 BMLR 144, 146 per
Ewbank J approved B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] Fam 133, 139F, 141C.
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section sixty-three has been held to include forcible feeding for the treat-
ment of anorexia nervosa71 or other psychiatric illnesses.72 More contro-
versially, it has been held to include inducing labour and performing a
Caesarean section on a pregnant paranoid schizophrenic where effective
treatment of the schizophrenia required that the patient give birth to a
live baby and resume medication necessarily interrupted by her preg-
nancy, including, if necessary, restraint and the use of reasonable force.7 3
Concern has been expressed that there is little to prevent the doctor
faced with an uncooperative pregnant woman who, judged from the doc-
tor's perspective, is acting unreasonably, from arranging to have the wo-
man "sectioned" temporarily74 simply for the purpose of enabling a
Caesarean section to be performed on her without her consent in accord-
ance with section sixty-three. The propriety of such a course has not yet
been judicially considered. At least some of the issues may shortly have
to be considered in Re S's Application for Judicial Review, 75 in which the
Court of Appeal granted a pregnant woman who was "sectioned" under
the Act and thereafter subjected to a nonconsensual Caesarean section
leave to apply for a judicial review of the various decisions.
VIII. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Where the obstacle in the doctor's way is the existence of an apparent
"advance directive," the court can be equally astute to find reasons for
declining to give effect to it.
In the first place, there is a curious and highly significant reversal of the
burden of proof. As we have seen, the burden of proof of self-determina-
tion is on those who seek to rebut the presumption of adult capacity and
to assert a lack of capacity. However, with advance directives, the burden
of proof is on those who seek to establish an advance directive that re-
fuses life-saving treatment or life-sustaining artificial feeding. If there is
doubt, "that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of
71. Riverside Mental Health NHS Trust v Fox [1994] 1 FLR 614; Re KB (Adult)
(Mental Patient: Medical Treatment) (1994) 19 BMLR 144; B v Croydon Health Authority
[1995] Farn 133, affirming [1995] 1 FCR 332.
72. Re VS (Adult: Mental Disorder) [1995] Aug. 17 (per Douglas Brown J), [1995]
Med L Rev 292.
73. Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762, 771c-774C.
74. This means compulsorily detained in accordance with the Mental Health Act 1983.
This process does not require prior judicial authorisation.
75. Re S's Application for Judicial Review [1997] 27 Fam Law 640.
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life."76 The evidence must be scrutinised with "especial care." Thus,
although there are no formal requirements for a valid advance directive,
which need not be in, or evidenced by, writing, and may be proved by a
single witness deposing to a conversation with the patient on a single oc-
casion, and although there is no requirement of corroboration, the ad-
vance directive must be "clearly established," not speculative and
expressed "in clear terms.",77 English law thus corresponds to the "spe-
cific-subjective-intent rule" applied in the United States by the New York
and Missouri courts, which requires "clear and convincing, inherently re-
liable evidence.",
78
There are six matters which have to be proved in order to establish an
advance directive that is binding and effective in relation to an adult in-
compet;ent: (1) that at the date of the advance directive the patient was
of sound mind (i.e., competent, as discussed earlier); (2) that the patient
had the capacity to make not merely a present but also an anticipatory
decision, that is, the capacity to weigh the consequences of future hypo-
thetical circumstances; 79 (3) that the patient knew in broad terms the na-
ture and effect of the procedure to which he was giving or refusing
consent;80 (4) that the patient's decision was (i) voluntary and unequivo-
cal, (ii) "real" and not "expressed in form only" and (iii) free of vitiating
influences (e.g., coercion or undue influence, the withholding of relevant
information, misinformation or mistake);81 (5) that the patient's decision
was made with reference to and was intended to cover the particular (and
perhaps changed or unforeseen) circumstances which have in fact subse-
quently occurred; 2 and (6) that the patient's expressed views represented
a carefully considered position rather than "informally expressed reac-
tions to other people's medical condition and treatment" or "an offhand
remark about not wanting to live under certain circumstances made by a
person when young and in the peak of health.
83
76. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatmeit) [1993] Fain 95, 112F per Lord Donaldson of
Lymington MR.
77. Id. at 102G, 103C, 112F; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864F.
78. In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607-08, 612-14 (Mo. 1988); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 415, 424-26 (N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
79. In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290, 295F.
80. Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, 442C, 442G-443E; In re T (Adult: Refusal of
Treatment) [1993] Fain 95, 115A-C.
81. Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, 443B; In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)
[1993] Fain 95, 113E-114B, 115C, 116B-D, 117C, 119H-120D, 121D-H.
82. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fain 95, 103C, 114B-F, 116D, 117D,
120D-G, 121H-122B.
83. Adopting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230, 1232 (N.J. 1985); In re Jobes, 529
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Again, it is difficult to fault this approach as a matter of formal law. But
in practice it is not too difficult to upset anything other than the most
carefully drawn and unequivocally expressed written advance directive.
Thus, applying these principles, the court in In re T refused to find that
there had been a valid and effective advance directive, even though the
patient had signed a refusal of consent to blood transfusions, on the
ground that she was not fit, because of her medical condition, to make a
genuine decision.85
IX. JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Other examples of the prevailing judicial reluctance to endorse whole-
heartedly the reality rather than the mere rhetoric of medical self-deter-
mination are not difficult to discern. Three will suffice for present
purposes.
The first example relates to competent patients. It might be thought
that for a doctor to proceed in defiance of his competent patient's known
refusal of consent would be treated as a serious infringement of the pa-
tient's fundamental human rights, calling for an award of substantial dam-
ages. This was the view of the Canadian judges in Malette v Shulman,
where the life of a Jehovah's Witness had been saved by a blood transfu-
sion carried out contrary to her known wishes and substantial damages
were awarded for mental distress.86 This approach does not find favour
in England. In In re T, Butler-Sloss and Staughton LJJ questioned
whether an English court would award such substantial damages in the
given circumstances.87
The second example relates to mature teenage children. The custodial
power that enables a parent to exercise physical control over the person
of the child, which is most relevant in the context of medical treatment,
necessarily comes to an end with the child's majority at the age of eight-
een. But it ceases in any event when the child reaches "the years of dis-
cretion."88 When the child achieves a sufficient understanding and
intelligence to enable him to comprehend fully what is proposed, he has
the capacity to give a valid consent to medical treatment. The conven-
A.2d 434, 443 (N.J. 1987); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988), appeal
dismissed, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
84. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95.
85. Id.
86. Malette v Shulman (1987) 47 DLR (4th) 18, (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321.
87. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 117B, 122D.
88. Hewer v Bryant [1970] 1 QB 357, 372B-373D.
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tional shorthand is to refer to such a child as having "Gillick capacity" or
as being "Gillick competent." The key to "Gillick competence" is the
child's understanding and intelligence. 9 In determining whether a partic-
ular child is "Gillick competent" in relation to a particular proposed
treatment, what is examined is the capacity to reach a mature and bal-
anced Jiudgment: "the attainment by a child of an age of sufficient discre-
tion to enable him or her to exercise a wise choice in his or her own
interests."9 Thus, as Lord Scarman said in Gillick v West Norfolk and
Wisbech Area Health Authority:
I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to deter-
mine whether or not their minor child below the age of 16 will
have medical treatment terminates if and when the child
ac.hieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable
him or her to understand fully what is proposed. It will be a
question of fact whether a child seeking advice has sufficient un-
derstanding of what is involved to give a consent valid in law.
91
Some of the factors to be taken into account are the child's understanding
and intelligence; his chronological, mental and emotional age; his intellec-
tual development and maturity and capacity to make up his own mind; his
ability to understand fully, and to appraise, the medical advice being
given, as well as the nature, consequences and implications of the advised
treatment; his capacity to comprehend the potential risks to his health,
and the, emotional impact of either accepting or rejecting the advised
treatment; and finally, his capability to understand any moral and family
questions involved.92
Furthermore, once the child reaches the age of sixteen, section 8(1) of
the Faraily Law Reform Act 1969 comes into play. It provides:
The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years
to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the ab-
sence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall
be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a
minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to
89. Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 169A-
F, 171E, 186D, 188H-189D, 195A, 201A; In re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's
Jurisdictinn) [1993] Fam 64, 81F.
90. Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 188A
per Lord Scarman.
91. Id. at 188H.
92. Id. at 174D, 189A-E, 190A, 201A-C; In re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to
Treatment) [1992] Fam 11, 26A.
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any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for
it from his parent or guardian.
It might be considered obvious that a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old
child, or a child who has not yet reached the age of sixteen but who is
"Gillick competent," would be treated as being free from parental deci-
sion making, and that such a child would thus be as entitled as an adult to
exercise the right of self-determination. Yet this is not the case.
In the first place, judges when faced with fractious teenagers are astute
enough to find that they lack capacity. Thus, fifteen-year-old Jehovah's
Witnesses refusing blood transfusions were held not to be "Gillick com-
petent" in Re E93 and Re S.94 In applying the test enunciated in In re C,95
a sixteen-year-old anorexic was held not to be competent to refuse treat-
ment in Re C.96
More surprisingly, and most controversially, it has been held that,
although a "Gillick competent" child's consent to treatment is as valid
and effective as the consent of a competent adult, a parent can lawfully
consent to the treatment of a "Gillick competent" child who is refusing to
consent. 97 Thus, while a parent cannot overrule a "Gillick competent"
child's consent to treatment,98 a parent can, in effect, overrule a "Gillick
competent" child's refusal to consent to treatment: the parent and the
child have concurrent powers to consent and, so it has been said, where
more than one person has a power of consent, only a failure to, or refusal
of, consent by all creates a veto.99 Nor is the court bound by the wishes or
decision of a "Gillick competent" child.100 Thus, the court, if it chooses to
exercise its inherent powers,10 1 can always outflank what might appear to
be the perfectly clear legislative policy laid down in the Children Act 1989
and do the very things which the Act has said that it shall not do.
93. Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386.
94. Re S (A Minor) (Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065.
95. In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290.
96. Re C (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180.
97. In re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fain 11, 23F-25A,
26F; In re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 84A,
86B, 87H; Re K, W and H (Minors) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 854, 859A-G.
98. In re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fain 11, 23F-H, 26F;
In re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 83H.
99. In re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fan 11, 22D, 26F.
100. Id. at 25F, 26H, 28G, 31F, 32C; In re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's
Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 81C, 84A-B, 88A, 93E-H; South Glamorgan County Council v
W and B [1993] 1 FLR 574, 584D-H.
101. As in South Glamorgan County Council v W and B [1993] 1 FLR 574 (order under
inherent jurisdiction for psychiatric examination and assessment of "Gillick competent"
child who had validly refused consent under Children Act 1989, section 38(6)).
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Perhaps even more surprisingly, and notwithstanding section 8(1) of
the 1969 Act, it has been held that in the case of a sixteen- or seventeen-
year-old child, as in the case of a "Gillick competent" child, while a par-
ent cannot overrule the child's consent to treatment, the parent can, in
effect, overrule such a child's refusal to consent to treatment. 10 2 Like-
wise, notwithstanding section 8(1), the court in the exercise of its inherent
parens patriae jurisdiction is not bound by the wishes of a sixteen- or sev-
enteen-year-old child.1"3 This view of the law has been the subject of se-
vere academic criticism, as involving an inappropriately narrow
construction of the language of section 8(1) of the Family Law Reform
Act 19,59, which had previously been considered as conferring "complete
autonomy" on the sixteen- or seventeen-year-old child.
This English view of what might be described as the autonomous
child's severely restricted autonomy has not found favour either in Can-
ada104 or even in Scotland,' 0 5 where the competent child10 6 is treated as
being precisely that, an autonomous individual not subject to either pa-
rental or judicial intervention. As Sheriff McGowan said in Re Houston:
It seems to me illogical that, on the one hand a person under the
age of 16 should be granted the power to decide upon medical
treatment for himself while, on the other hand, his parents have
the right to override his decision.., logic demands that the mi-
nor's decision is paramount.
1 0 7
The final example relates to incompetent adults. With respect to con-
cerns about an incompetent adult's property and affairs, the English court
applies, and has always applied, a subjective substituted judgment test.
10 8
The principle is an old one, going back to Ex p Whitbread.1°9 Some juris-
dictions in the United States have extended the substituted judgment test;
102. In re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fain 11, 24C-H, 26F;
In re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 74E-79F, 83G,
84A, 861, 87H.
103. In re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fain 11; In re W (A
Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 81C, 83G, 84A, 91C, 92G.
104. Walker v Region 2 Hospital Corporation (1994) 116 DLR (4th) 477.
105. Re Houston (1996) 32 BMLR 93 (declining to follow the English authorities).
106. In Scotland, the matter is regulated by the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act
1991, section 2(4), which in effect introduces in Scotland a statutory equivalent of the Eng-
lish common law test of "Gillick competence."
107. Re Houston (1996) 32 BMLR 93, 98.
108. In re D (J) [1982] Ch 237, 244C per Megarry VC ("[the] court must seek to [do
that] which the actual patient, acting reasonably, would have [done] if notionally restored
to full mental capacity, memory and foresight").
109. Ex p Whitbread [1816] 2 Mer 99, 102.
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sometimes by explicitly adopting the English property cases and, in par-
ticular, Ex p Whitbread to questions relating to the patient's body.11 °
However, English law, in common with a number of other jurisdictions in
the United States, which also apply a best interests test,"' has rejected
the subjective substituted judgment test regarding questions about the pa-
tient's physical and bodily welfare in favour of an objective best interests
test. " 2 The reason for the divergence in English law between the objec-
tive test applied in cases affecting the person of the incompetent and the
subjective substituted judgment test applied in cases relating to his prop-
erty has never been explained or explored. Again, however, it is indica-
tive of the reluctance of English judges to allow the patient to have as
much control as possible over his body.
110. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 1969); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386-
87 (Conn. 1972); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64, 666 (N.J. 1976); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977); In re Doe, 583
N.E.2d 1263, 1267, 1273 (Mass. 1992).
111. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. 1973); Lausier v. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d
180-82, 184 (Wis. 1975); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 497-98 (Tex. 1979); Curran v.
Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1326, 1331 (Ill. 1990).
112. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 871G-872E, 894G-895D.
